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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent,

:

v.

:

JORGE AQUILAR,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 870327-CA

Category No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant to U.C.A. Section 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1986).

NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This is an appeal from a criminal conviction for
Possession of a Controlled Substance, a Third-Degree Felony,
U.C.A. Section 58-37-8 (2)(a)(i), and a final judgment of the
Fourth District Court, Judge Boyd L. Park presiding.

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Did the trial court err in ruling that the defendants
fourth amendment

rights against unreasonable searches and

seizures had not been violated when the defendant was stopped and
searched as a direct result of defendant's failure to make eye
contact with a highway patrol trooper, who then claimed that the
defendant's behavior supported a "reasonable suspicion, based on
objective facts" that the defendant was engaged in criminal
activity?

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATE STATUTES
A.

United States Constitution, Amendment IV.

The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
B.

Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 14.

The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable
cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or
thing to be seized.
C.

Utah Code Annotated, Section 77-7-15 (1982).

A peace officer may stop any person in a public
place when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he
has committed or is in the act of committing or is
attempting to commit a public offense and may demand
his name, address and an explanation of his actions.
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of t h e Case.

This

is

an

appeal

from

a criminal

conviction

for

P o s s e s s i o n of a C o n t r o l l e d S u b s t a n c e , a Third-Degree Felony,

and

a f i n a l judgment of the Fourth D i s t r i c t Court, Judge Boyd L. Park
presiding.
B.

Course of the P r o c e e d i n g s .

Defendant
Circuit
was

made h i s

first

Court on March 18, 1987.

supplied

preliminary

with
hearing

a

appearance
In a l l

heard

25)

the

Fourth

District

Court

on March 2 3 ,

on

D e f e n d a n t ' s Motion t o D i s m i s s ,

April
or

Eighth

interpreter.

Defendant e n t e r e d h i s not g u i l t y p l e a before
of

the

court appearances,

Spanish-speaking
was

in

1987.

The
(R.

Judge Boyd L.
3,

in t h e

1987.

he

4)
Park

(R.

24-

Alternative,

to

Suppress Evidence was f i l e d upon April 22, 1987 (R. 2 7 ) , and the
suppression

h e a r i n g was heard by Judge Park on April

28,

one day before the t r i a l . D e f e n d a n t ' s motion was d e n i e d .

1987,
(R. 39-

40)
C.

D i s p o s i t i o n in the Court Below.

Defendant was t r i e d before a j u r y and was found
on A p r i l

2 9 , 1987.

sentenced

to an i n d e t e r m i n a t e

the

(R. 73-78)

On June 5, 1987 defendant

term not to exceed f i v e

Utah

State

Prison,

probation,

fined

$1,000.00 and a s s e s s e d

R e p a r a t i o n Fund.

but

guilty

was p l a c e d

on

years

$250.00 for

(R. 84-85)

3

in

court-supervised
the

Victims

All p r i s o n time was suspended, except for

months in t h e Utah County J a i l .

was

six

D.

Statement of the Facts.
1.

The State's Witnesses1 Testimony.

As Sergeant Paul Mangelson of the Utah Highway Patrol
was driving north on March 14, 1987, he observed the defendant
walking across the "old" Highway 91 south of Nephi.

(R. 124)

The defendant, a native of Mexico, was carrying a gas can.
136, 121)

(R.

Sergeant Mangelson pulled a U-turn and slowly, at

three to four miles per hour, approached the defendant, so that
he could offer the defendant a ride.

Although the sergeant's car

came within four or five feet of the defendant, the defendant did
not make eye contact with the sergeant.

The sergeant believed

that the defendant was "completely avoiding" him.
122)

(R. 121-

The sergeant made no effort to speak with the defendant and

did not turn on his overhead lights.

(R. 130-131)

The defendant then began to walk up the freeway off
ramp.

(R. 126)

Sergeant Mangelson "wanted to take a look at

this guy when he come back and why he was acting or why he was
avoiding me struck me real funny."

(sic)

(R. 126)

He

positioned his patrol car where he could see the three gas
stations in the immediate area and waited to see the defendant
return for more gasoline.

(R. 122)

Sergeant Mangelson waited 20 minutes, but did not see
the defendant return.
freeway,

stopped

(R. 122)

Another trooper exited the

to talk to the sergeant, and, upon the

sergeant's question, advised him that he had seen a person "with
a can of gas putting gas in the vehicle," and that the vehicle
4

was a blue and white van.

This second trooper also advised the

sergeant that the driver and the vehicle had proceeded north
about fifteen minutes prior to this conversation.

(R. 122) Upon

receiving this information, the sergeant radioed dispatch to have
a trooper in the "south end" take a "close look at this blue and
white van."

(R. 123)

Trooper Doug Rawlinson of the Utah Highway Patrol was
"stationary" at the southbound side of the freeway south of the
south Santaquin interchange, having pulled over a driver for
speeding, when he heard the dispatch over his car radio regarding
the blue and white van.

Although he could not distinguish

Sergeant Mangelson's words over the radio, he noted an "urgency"
in Sergeant Mangelsonfs voice.

(R. 132) The trooper allowed the

speeding driver to leave and then received instructions from
dispatch to watch for a "blue and white van and take a close look
at it."

As he listened to the radio, he noticed the van coming

from the south on the other side of the freeway.

(R. 132)

The trooper testified that, as he watched from the
other side of the freeway, the defendant "didn't look at me he
stared straight ahead even though I had been in plain view for
quite a distance, he didn't make any acknowledgement that I was
there and just stared straight ahead . . ."

(sic) (R. 133)

At

this time, the trooper also noted that the defendant's van was
possibly too close to the car ahead of it.

(R. 133)

Upon

questioning by defense counsel, the trooper admitted that,
without the transmission over his radio regarding the blue and
5

white van, he "probably wouldn't have noticed [the defendant]
when he drove by, "

(R. 139-140) as he was still busy with the

driver he had pulled over for speeding.
In order to follow the defendant, the trooper pulled a
U-turn on the freeway and caught up with the defendant.

(R. 133)

He then activated his overhead lights and stopped the defendant's
vehicle because it was weaving back and forth, and he believed
that the defendant might possibly be intoxicated.
134)

(R. 133-

Although the trooper determined that the defendant was not

intoxicated, the trooper invited the defendant back to his patrol
car, since the defendant had not been able to immediately produce
the registration for the van and to name the owner of the van.
(R. 136)

The trooper, through the use of the radio, determined

that the van was not stolen, but obtained the defendant's written
consent to search the van.

(R. 136-137)

He and Sergeant

Mangelson, who had driven to the scene of the stop, found
evidence during the search of the van upon which the State filed
its information for possession of a controlled substance.

(R.

138)
2.

The Defendant's Testimony.

The defendant's van ran out of fuel on the freeway in
the area of Nephi, Utah at approximately 8:00 p.m. on March 13,
1987, after which the defendant waited for the highway patrol to
assist him.

No highway patrol troopers came, so he spent the

night in his van.

(R. 101)

At about 7:00 a.m. the next morning,

he caught a ride to a gas station, where he spent $3.00 for

6

gasoline which he poured into his gas can.

(R. 101-102) Without

incident and without passing any highway patrol vehicles, he then
returned to his van and poured the gasoline into the gas tank.
(R. 102-103)
At that time he noticed a highway patrol trooper pass
his van.

(R. 102-103)

He then returned in the van to the gas

station and spent $13.00 to put gasoline into both the van and
the gas can.

(R. 108-109)

He did not see any highway patrol

vehicles in the area of the gas stations off the freeway during
this second trip to the gas station.

(R. 113)

He then returned

to the freeway and continued on his journey, until he was stopped
by Trooper Rawlinson of the Utah Highway Patrol.

(R. 103, 109)

The defendant did not recall driving in any manner which would
have justified a stop by the highway patrol.

(R. 103)

After he was stopped by the trooper, he was taken back
to the trooper's vehicle, where he voluntarily gave his written
consent for the search of his van.

(R. 105-106)

The trial court, after hearing the testimony of the
defendant and the State's witnesses, chose to believe the State's
testimony as to the facts.

(R. 145-147)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The citizens of Utah are protected from unreasonable
searches and seizures by both the United States Constitution and
the Constitution of Utah.

The United States Supreme Court

established the standard for investigatory stops which do not

7

amount to official arrests in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968),
and in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979), which standard has
been codified in U.C.A. Section 77-7-15.

An officer must have a

"reasonable suspicion" to believe that the person he wants to
stop is presently or has been involved in criminal activity.

If

this reasonable suspicion exists, he may demand a name, address
and an explanation of the person's actions.
hunch will not suffice.

An inarticulate

Terry, supra.

In the instant case, this Hispanic defendant's van was
ultimately searched and seized, and the defendant was arrested
and convicted

of the crime of possession of a controlled

substance because of an officer's inarticulate hunch.

The

officer's hunch was based upon the defendant's alleged refusal to
make eye contact with the officer, while the officer, in his
patrol car, passed the defendant, who was walking along a state
road toward the freeway with a can of gasoline in his hand.
Based

upon this brief incident and the officer's

unfounded suspicions, the officer waited for the defendant to
return to the gas station for more gasoline.

When the defendant

did not fulfill the officer's expectations by returning for more
gasoline, the officer called dispatch on his radio and asked for
other officers to watch for this defendant.
would have never noticed

Another officer, who

the defendant without the radio

transmission from dispatch, saw the defendant, pulled a U-turn on
the freeway and followed the defendant, eventually pulling the
defendant over because he was allegedly weaving back and forth in
8

h i s l a n e of

traffic.

The
have

Utah

recently

v.

stops

Utah,

not

engaged

have
in

activity.

a

defendant

notifying

obtained

as

Rep.

718 ( 1 9 8 5 ) .

of

to

52

dispatch
of

to

a

second

searched

the

van.

the

search

e x c l u d e d by t h e lower

of

instant

(1987)

that

and

a c t e d upon h i s

notice

the

v.

found
officer

and

later
of

was

criminal

unreasonable

officers

Admission
of

State

defendant

attempted

officer

for
case:

reasoning

the

or

radio

suspicion,

a result

the

have o t h e r

the

Appeals

highway p a t r o l

present,

officer

of

standards

Using t h e

suspicion

past,

Because

and

concise

similar

Adv.

However, t h e f i r s t

unreasonable

Utah C o u r t

is clear that the f i r s t

type

vehicle.

and

very

60 U t a h

reasonable

any

suspicion,
the

it

and t h e

clear

cases

699 P.2d

in these c a s e s ,
did

in

Trujillo,

Swanigan,

Court

enunciated

investigatory
State

Supreme

watch
the

for
same

stopped
the

van s h o u l d

the

evidence
have

been

court.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE
D E F E N D A N T ' S FOURTH AMENDMENT R I G H T S AGAINST
UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES HAD NOT BEEN
VIOLATED AS A RESULT OF THE F I R S T O F F I C E R ' S
UNREASONABLE SUSPICIONS OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY AND THE
SECOND OFFICER'S INVESTIGATORY STOP.
The

Fourth

its

virtual

Amendment

Constitution

and

twin,

Constitution

of U t a h , b o t h g u a r a n t e e

be p r o t e c t e d

from

unreasonable

Article

the
I,

the right

searches
9

of

and

United
Section
of

States
14 of

individuals

seizures.

In

the
to

Terry

v> Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, the United States Supreme Court ruled
that the conduct of peace officers making "investigatory stops"
or "searches" which do not amount to arrests must be evaluated by
the following objective standard:
And in making that assessment it is imperative
that the facts be judged against an objective standard:
would the facts available to the officer at the moment
of the seizure or the search "warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief" that the action taken
was appropriate? Anything less would invite intrusions
upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on
nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches, a
result this Court has consistently refused to sanction.
Thus, officers of the law are prohibited by the U.S.
Constitution

and the Utah Constitution

from acting upon

suspicions which are unreasonable and groundless or merely
"inarticulate hunches."
In addition, the United States Supreme Court has
determined that a seizure occurs when, because of an officer's
show of authority or physical force, a person believes he is not
free to walk away from the officer.

State v. Trujillo, 60 Utah

Adv. Rep. 52, 53, (Utah App. Ct. 1987), quoting from United
States v. Mendenhall, 466 U.S. 544, 533 and 555 (1980).

The

Court further illustrated this concept by giving examples:
Examples of circumstances t h a t might i n d i c a t e a
s e i z u r e , even where t h e person did not a t t e m p t t o
l e a v e , would be the t h r e a t e n i n g p r e s e n c e of s e v e r a l
o f f i c e r s , the display of a weapon by an o f f i c e r , some
physical touching of the person of the c i t i z e n , or the
u s e of l a n g u a g e or tone of voice i n d i c a t i n g t h a t
c o m p l i a n c e w i t h t h e o f f i c e r ' s r e q u e s t might be
compelled. T r u j i l l o at 53.
Unless a person i s "seized" by an officer within the meaning
of the Constitution as i l l u s t r a t e d
10

above, then i t

is

impossible

for the person's Fourth Amendment rights to have been violated.
Id. at 53.
Utah

has

unconstitutional

further
searches

guaranteed
and s e i z u r e s

this

right

against

by c o d i f y i n g

Terry

in

U.C.A. 7 7 - 7 - 1 5 :
A peace officer may stop any person in a public
place when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he
has committed or is in the act of committing or is
attempting to commit a public offense and may demand
his name, address and an explanation of his actions.
It should be noted that this Utah statute further
defines the scope of reasonable suspicion by requiring that the
officer believe that the person is involved in some type of
criminal activity, either past, present, or attempted.
Carpena, Utah, 714 P.2d 674, 675 (1986).

State v.

It is not enough that a

person may act in a manner inconsistent with the expectations of
the officer.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO APPLY ESTABLISHED UTAH
STATUTORY LAW AND UTAH CASE LAW (SWANIGAN AND TRUJILLO)
WHEN IT RULED THAT BOTH OFFICERS HAD REASONABLE
SUSPICION THAT DEFENDANT WAS INVOLVED IN CRIMINAL
ACTIVITY.
1.

State v. Trujillo, 60 Utah Adv. Rep. 52 (1987).

The Utah Court of Appeals has very recently dealt with
the

issue of searches

and

seizures

investigatory stops in State v. Trujillo.

as they

relate

to

In this case, the Utah

Court of Appeals, Judge Billings, writing the opinion, outlined a
two-step analysis for determining that a person's right to
11

protection from unreasonable searches and seizures has been
violated during an investigatory stop:

(1)

The Court must find

that there has been a seizure; and (2) the Court must find that
the seizure was unconstitutional.
In determining whether a seizure had occurred in
Trujillo, the Court of Appeals used the standards established in
Mendenhall and discussed above.

The Court found that a seizure

had, indeed, occurred, because the defendant had been physically
held by the officer and then ordered to place his hands on the
patrol car and spread his feet.

Additionally, the officer

performed a pat-down search of the defendant's person.

Trujillo

at 53.
In the instant case, there certainly was a seizure of
the defendant.

Both the defendant and Trooper

Rawlinson

testified that the trooper "invited" the defendant back to sit in
the trooper's patrol car.

(R. 105, 136)

It was in the confines

of the trooper's patrol car that the defendant consented to the
search of his van.

Shortly thereafter, an additional officer,

Sergeant Mangelson, arrived on the scene.

(R. 137)

Although the

defendant had not yet been placed under arrest, he certainly,
based upon the totality of the circumstances, was not free to get
in his van and leave—there were several highway patrol officers
present, he did not speak English as a native language, and he
had been lead back to the highway patrol car by Trooper
Rawlinson.

Therefore, the first step of the Court's two-step

analysis was satisfied: there was a seizure of the defendant
12

under the Fourth Amendment.
In determining whether the seizure in Trujillo was
constitutional, the Court looked very carefully at the fact
situation, using the standards found in Terry and U.C.A. Section
77-7-15 (1982), and found that the seizure was unconstitutional.
The officer stopped Trujillo and his friends on State Street in
Salt Lake City because of the lateness of the hour (3:30 a.m.),
the high-crime factor of the area, the apparent nervous conduct
of the three friends, and the suspicious nylon knapsack Trujillo
was carrying.

Id. at 52, 54.

The Court found that these four

factors did not support a reasonable suspicion that criminal
activity was occurring.

The trio was not loitering, but was

consistently making progress down the street.
addition, the Court found

Id. at 52.

that the nervous behavior

consistent with both innocent and criminal behavior.

In
was

Id. at 54.

The officer never inquired as to the knapsack, nor did he
articulate what concerned him about the knapsack.

Id. at 54.

The Court found that the officer had been unable to point to
specific facts to support his hunch that some criminal activity
was occurring on State Street.

Id. at 55.

Therefore, the pat-

down search violated Trujillo's Fourth Amendment protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures, and the evidence
obtained in the pat-down search should have been suppressed.

Id.

In applying Trujillo decision to the instant case, it
is clear that the suspicions of the first officer, Sergeant
Mangelson, which lead to the notification of the second officer,
13

were unreasonable and nothing more than an inarticulate hunch.
In his testimony at the suppression hearing, the

sergeant

testified that there was no law against running out of gas on the
freeway, and that the defendant was breaking no law by walking
with a gas can toward the freeway.

(R. 128)

The sergeant also

testified that the defendant was under no legal obligation to
make eye contact with the him.

(R. 128)

In addition, the

sergeant never turned on his overhead lights to require the
defendant to speak with him, nor did he simply stop and ask the
defendant if he needed a ride.

(R. 128)

Other than driving

slowly by and close to the defendant, the officer himself made no
effort to communicate with the defendant, but he still found the
defendant's behavior suspicious*

(R. 130-131)

As in Trujillo, the defendant was not involved in any
activity which would have been unusual or suspicious.

He was

simply performing a task which, unfortunately, many people have
had to perform once or twice — walking or hitchhiking for gas
after failing to plan ahead.

And, as in Trujillo, the sergeant

became suspicious because of what amounted to nervous behavior—
the defendant refused to look at the sergeant.

As the Court

noted previously, this could be "consistent with innocent as well
as with criminal behavior."

Defense counsel noted in her final

argument at the suppression hearing that it is not "unusual for
anyone driving down the freeway to avoid meeting the eyes of an
officer at the side of the road.

[She believed that] anyone who

has gone around the point of the mountain and suddenly seen an
14

officer and slammed on the brakes has not attempted to meet the
eyes of the officer."

(R. 143)

Under this officer's standard of

reasonable suspicion, most drivers could be stopped on a daily
basis.
The sergeant's suspicions were further heightened when
the defendant failed to return for more gas.

(R. 126)

Even if

the trial court chose to believe the sergeant's version of the
facts over the defendant's version, the sergeant could not
justifiably suspect that the defendant was involved in criminal
activity just because he failed to purchase more gas in the Nephi
area.
Therefore, under the standards established by the Utah
Court of Appeals in Trujillo, it is clear that Sergeant Mangelson
could not and did not articulate reasonable objective facts for
suspecting that the defendant had engaged in or was about to
engage in criminal conduct, and that Sergeant Mangelson had no
justification for calling dispatch and requesting that another
officer watch for and look closely at the defendant's blue and
white van.

(R. 123)
2.

State v. Swanigan, Utah, 699 P.2d 718 (1985).

Previous to the Utah Court of Appeals ruling in
Trujillo, the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Swanigan, a case
very similar to the instant case because of the involvement of
two police officers, briefly addressed the question of the
standard to be used by officers in making investigatory stops.
In this case, a police officer enroute to the scene of a burglary
15

noticed two individuals walking along a road about a block from
the burglarized home.

The two individuals allegedly "stared" at

the officer, who then called the dispatcher and requested a
broadcast of an "attempt to locate" the two individuals he had
seen.

Id. at 719.
Over two hours later, a second officer spotted two

individuals who fit the description given by the first officer
and stopped them and asked for identification.

A warrant check

made on the two men revealed an outstanding traffic warrant on
one of the individuals, and the second officer arrested both men.
Items stolen from the burglarized home were then recovered during
a pat-down search of the pair.

Id. at 719.

The Utah Supreme Court found that the evidence seized
during the pat-down search had been erroneously admitted at the
trial.

The Court based its analysis on the standard found in

Terry and further quoted Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979),
noting that a brief investigatory stop of an individual is
permissible when the officers "have a reasonable suspicion, based
on objective facts, that the individual is involved in criminal
activity."

Swanigan at 719.

It is this standard from Brown v.

Texas that has been codified in U.C.A. 77-7-15.
In Swanigan the Utah Court found that both officers
lacked a reasonable suspicion that the two individuals might have
been involved in criminal activity.

The second officer stopped

the two men solely because of the first officer's description of
two men seen in the neighborhood of a recent burglary.
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Neither

officer had observed

the men engaged

in any unlawful or

suspicious activity or had any knowledge that the men had been at
the scene of the crime.

Id. at 719.

The Court found that the

stop was based on a "mere hunch," as in Terry v. Ohio, rather
than on reasonable suspicion.
In the instant case, ironically, rather than raising
the officer's suspicions by staring at the police officer, this
Hispanic defendant raised Sergeant MangelsonTs suspicions by
refusing to make eye contact with the officer, thereby convincing
the sergeant that the defendant was engaged in criminal activity.
Unfortunately for the defendant, like the defendants in Swanigan,
he was unable to correctly guess how to react while walking past
a police vehicle.
Twenty minutes later the sergeant radioed ahead because
the defendant failed to fulfill the sergeant's expectations that
he would immediately return for more gasoline.

The failure to

make eye contact and to return for more gas comprised the sum
total of the sergeant's "reasonable suspicion" of criminal
activity.

By this officer's reasoning, it would appear that

every driver passing through Utah can now be reasonably suspected
of criminal activity

if he runs out of gas and fails to

immediately return to a gas station after using gasoline from a
gas can to partially refuel his vehicle.

Clearly, the sergeant

was acting upon nothing more than the "inarticulate hunch"
frowned upon by the U.S. Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio and by
the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Swanigan.
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As a result of the sergeant's inarticulate hunch,
another officer, who was busy at the time and who would not have
otherwise noticed the defendant's van, was requested by dispatch
to watch for the defendant's vehicle, which coincidentally passed
him at the very moment he was listening to the radio dispatcher.
At this point the facts in Swanigan and the instant case can be
just slightly distinguished.

In Swanigan the second officer

stopped the individuals strictly because they fit the general
description given by the first officer.

After backup officers

arrived, a warrant check was made on the two men, an arrest
warrant was discovered with regard to Swanigan, and the arrest
and pay-down search followed. In this fact situation, even though
the officers may have attempted to justify the arrest and
subsequent search through the discovery of the outstanding arrest
warrant, the Court found that there had been no reasonable
suspicion to support the stop.

Id. at 719.

In the instant case, the second officer admits that,
without the notification by dispatch over his radio to watch for
a blue and white van, he probably would have never noticed the
defendant's blue and white van.

(R. 42-43)

With no other reason

or justification other than the first officer's hunch, the second
officer watched the blue and white van pass by him on the other
side of the freeway.

He then conveniently noticed that the van

might be following the car ahead too closely.

(R. 133)

After

noticing, like the first officer, that the defendant refused to
look across the freeway at him and make eye contact or "any
18

acknowledgement" that the officer was watching him from across
the freeway, the second officer pulled a U-turn on the freeway
and followed the defendant's vehicle until he caught up with it.
After closing in on the vehicle, the officer, again, conveniently
noticed that the van was traveling five miles per hour under the
speed limit and that it was weaving in its lane.

At that point

he activated his overhead lights and pulled the defendant over.
(R. 133-134)
Although the second officer in the instant case had to
work harder and longer than the second officer in Swanigan to
stop the defendant, the end result in both cases is the same. As
in Swanigan, all evidence acquired as a result of the search was
inadmissible.

The events leading to the search of the vehicle

and the subsequent arrest of the defendant were a direct result
of Sergeant Mangelson ' s unconstitutional hunch regarding the
defendant's behavior.

There was absolutely no reasonable

suspicion to justify the sergeant's notifying dispatch that the
defendant's vehicle should be watched for and followed.

The

second officer's reasonable suspicion that the defendant was
involved in criminal activity was the result of the notice over
the radio, the defendant's failure to look across the freeway,
thereby acknowledging the officer's presence, and the officer's
weak excuse that the defendant may have been following another
vehicle too closely.

However, these reasons do not amount to

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity; under Swanigan and
Trujillo, these reasons only amount to the forbidden inarticulate
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hunch.
Clearly, the rules and reasoning set forth in Trujillo
and Swanigan

are persuasive

that both officers failed to

establish reasonable suspicion of criminal activity on the part
of the defendant.

The trial court erred when it refused to

suppress the admission of the evidence found in the illegal
search and seizure.

CONCLUSION
Defendant respectfully requests that, because

his

Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the two highway patrol
officers, his conviction for possession of a controlled substance
be reversed and that the case be remanded to the lower court for
a new trial.
DATED this 22nd day of AprIE, 1987.
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